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Abstract 
   
India faces water management challenges. The agriculture sector is the largest user and 
polluter of water but the water resource management has had a duality of good design 
and poor implementation. The agricultural water management is in a conflict between 
institutional and political priorities in ensuring security for food and rural livelihood. In 
Punjab, a concern is growing about sustainability among farming community over 
income and production of rice and of freshwater for needs of farmers and increasingly 
for non-agricultural sectors. The political pressure for efficiency of water use and for 
conservation and allocation is growing but necessitates a critical analysis as to whether 
this constitutes the most effective and only prescription to overcome the challenge 
Punjab faces. There is an ambiguity in the concept of economic efficiency especially of 
defining cost and value of water and conditions surrounding production and livelihood 
of individual farmer in the state complicate rather than simplify the question of 
appropriateness and validity of application of optimal water and/or electricity pricing in 
Punjab. Various findings and discussions show how this may be the case and indicate 
very broad issues such as international trade that requires coordination among wide 
ranging departments and stakeholders to identify suitable mix of options available for 
Punjab. 
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1.Introduction  
Pricing water for irrigation is one of the policy interventions which have been 
discussed controversially for many years in the context of sustainable management of 
both water resource as well as agricultural economy. Experiences of Punjab state in the 
northwest of India is perhaps an illustrative example of precarious groundwater 
condition which exhibits the conflicting need to restructure public policies for reliable 
and sustainable management of surface and groundwater resource for irrigation supply 
and the economic benefits they have brought to farmers.  
A juncture of the policy reform lies in a revision of supply side technological 
solution; dams and canals to maximize economic returns
1
. Those who advocate 
promotion of demand side management point to supply side approach which failed to 
ensure efficiency of irrigation water use and irrigation service sector and argue for 
robust changes for Indian agricultural water management from the Green Revolution 
era. The shift entails wide ranging measures and a need for a framework to embrace 
very wide and diverse aspects associated with water resource use. Integrated Water 
Resources Management (IWRM) could be one way to present a conceptual framework,   
but ultimate importance continues to lie with a concrete structural reform; whether 
optimal pricing and a removal of distortion to service price via subsidies made to water 
and electricity for irrigators in Punjab has any appropriateness and feasibility to address 
                                                   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 OECD 2010:34 
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the problems on irrigation water sustainability while maintaining and restoring strength 
of Punjab‟s agricultural economy. These represent hard measures to swallow for users 
and policy makers in the context of a political agenda for food and farmer livelihood 
security.  It is important to understand effectiveness of other non-pricing approaches to 
the problem more accommodating to the region‟s socio economic reality. Particular 
aspects such as Indian national rice policy on which international trade regime lurking a 
shadow influence should also be considered. Since major changes in Indian national 
food security policy is not likely, author stands for a position that impact mitigation has 
to be considered both for environment and farmer livelihood when a structural reform is 
sought. Due to Punjab‟s idiosyncratic condition such as saturation of land area under 
irrigation and conscious and proactive farmer community, moderate strategy can be as 
much effective and buy time to avert social and economic distress of weaker farmers 
while tackling structural issues.        
 
1.1 Problem statement and Research question 
    Rice and wheat cropping system in north western part of India which was brought by 
the Green Revolution has seen stagnation in productivity growth and has not kept pace 
with faster population growth
2
. Economic growth and climate change uncertainty would 
mean a potential change in the current pattern of allocation and availability of water. 
                                                   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 Erenstein, 2009:1799 
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The public irrigation policy in canal systems and development of groundwater have 
both resulted in salinization, waterlogging and over withdrawal
3 . It is Punjab‟s 
agricultural water management systems this thesis raises questions with regard to the 
system‟s institutional capacity to cope with rising pressure to use water more efficiently.  
 This thesis aims to test the research question as to whether demand side management 
measures, especially economic optimization of pricing is a right and realistic 
prescription or at least a right path to promote efficient and sustainable use of irrigation 
water and agriculture in Indian Punjab.   It is important to note that this analysis has a 
boundary. While water covers wide ranging elements; physical, political, legal (incl. 
human right), social and economic, main focus is on a relationship between the local 
agricultural institutions and policies into which the notion of optimal pricing is tested.  
Hence discussions and conclusion in this thesis do not necessarily imply applicability to 
contexts outside of the studied region. 
 
Chapter two introduces the complexity of the idea and tries to show a relative nature 
of the value and costs of water and various pricing methods are conceptually challenged 
in a context of irrigation. Chapter three deals with the Indian policy, legal and 
institutional systems of water management for irrigation and analyzes critically for 
adoptability of pricing in developing an efficient mechanism such as trading through 
                                                   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 Erenstein, 2009:1800 
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market and for cost recovery. Chapter four aims to gain familiarity with a particularity 
of Punjab‟s agricultural economy, irrigation patterns, and individual farmer welfare and 
how they are “fixed” with a food security policy of India which includes price supports 
and input subsidies. In chapter five, a detailed and critical analysis of the contexts of 
previous chapters is made. This chapter invokes a designing of pricing in two tiered 
structure such as attempted in France because of farmers‟ strong inclination for 
reliability of water supply and low price elasticity of farmers for water. However with 
absence of alternative choice, the single volumetric price increase may be too damaging 
in the current irrigation water arrangement in Punjab. Chapter six tries to discuss 
effectiveness of two possible alternative demand side management measures available 
for Punjab. Water amount and energy cost saving techniques and long term, but targeted 
structural reform on electricity subsidy to pave way for progressive introduction of (two 
tiered) pricing for better allocation efficiency and cost recovery in the future.   
In Chapter seven, the author concludes with a suggestion of conditions which appear 
to be conducive to implementing a more robust reform which can accommodate 
economic pricing of water.  
 
1.2 Scope and methodology 
 This thesis is primarily a theoretical review from existing literature on irrigation water 
pricing and institutional aspects of water management in Punjab (and in India). The 
discussion relies on analyzing economic concepts on water pricing policies and social 
and institutional setting in Punjab and India. Sources are drawn from case evidences 
both empirical and non-empirical (i.e. based on simulation data only) and drawn from 
10 
 
 
 
cases in other countries, notably in France, for a comparison. Physical analysis of 
hydrology, water quality, or geology of aquifer, though equally essential subjects in 
water management, is not a scope of this thesis. 
 
2. Conceptual Discussion for Water Value and Cost    
Before the discussion over what constitutes an optimal policy of pricing, the basic 
conceptual differences between water charging and pricing and value and cost first 
needs to be clarified. Charging encompasses all the policies and actual instruments 
required such as the appropriate level of cost recovery, basis on which the charge is 
made, and implementation both for levying and collecting the revenue, whereas pricing 
refers to price per unit quantity of water
4
. The latter is often interpreted as volumetric 
evaluation which increases political and cultural sensitivity in some countries that 
instead opt for the use of charging for the service of water supply to disconnect it from 
the value of water itself
5
. 
It is more important to highlight that there are no agreed principles in terms of how in 
practice costs and value should be applied in price to various uses. Economic values are 
indications of human preferences for service and products and are not inherent in them
6
. 
                                                   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 FAO 2004:4 
5 Ibid. FAO:4 
6 Natural Research Council, US, 1997:70 
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Broadly, water price is divided in the full supply costs which are a reflection of 
infrastructural service cost and the full economic costs which include externality and 
opportunity cost. The full supply costs include costs of supplying water to users only 
and are divided into operation and maintenance (O&M) costs of concurrent 
management components such as electricity for pumping, labour and repair costs for the 
supply infrastructure such as irrigation canal and dam and capital costs of renewal and 
new investment of the infrastructure
7
. The full economic costs however cover the 
opportunity (resource) costs and the economic cost of externalities in addition to the full 
supply costs and would entail efficiency and internalization of ecosystem values and 
hence more accountable for wider social welfare whereas it is the full supply cost for 
which financial recovery of infrastructure investment is usually concerned. The 
opportunity cost pricing implies resource will be allocated to the use which produces a 
higher value
8
. For instance water market is a mechanism in which opportunity cost may 
determine allocation efficiency among competing demands in a society between 
different sectoral uses between industries, hydroelectric generation and potentially 
recreation and environmental needs. In reality the financial implications for realizing 
full economic cost pricing may be so enormous that implementation costs associated 
with data collection, weather forecasting, afforestation, land use regulation, ecosystem 
                                                   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 Ibid. OECD, 2010:36 
8 Ibid. OECD, 2010:36 
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management and pollution control in addition to physical infrastructure is suggested to 
cripple budgetary capacity of local governments in arranging the market mechanism
9
. 
Nevertheless, the underlying logic is optimal pricing may serve to demand side 
management policy goal of ensuring viable and sustainable irrigation water governance. 
Optimal pricing delivers a signal to users informing of scarcity value of water and 
supply cost and incentivise conservation of water and ecosystems in addition to cost 
recovery of infrastructure investment for efficient and long term operation
10
.   
Water for irrigated farming consists of the largest consumptive use and a shift to 
optimal pricing linking to volume used rather than non-volumetric methods, notably 
area water is applied, has been advocated as the most crucial but difficult option in the 
demand management strategy. This volumetric pricing which is equal to the marginal 
cost of supplying water (i.e. the cost of supplying one more unit of water) is said to be 
the most efficient as it reflects scarcity value in a source (e.g. river), infrastructural 
(capital and running) and administrative costs and in theory generates the highest return 
for the amount of water used
11
 because this incentivise water users to make efficient 
decisions whether to increase their water use through cost benefit analysis
12
. In contrast, 
area based charging is the most common method for irrigation in which users are 
                                                   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9 Winpenny, J and Camdessus, M, 2003:5 
10 EUWI-FWG, 2011:14 
11 Webber, M et al., 2008: 619 
12 PRI Synthesis Report, 2005 :16 
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charged per irrigated area and easy in implementation and administration
13
but it is 
regarded as “fixed” cost and efficiency is low because of its weaker influence on the 
cost benefit analysis of balancing input and output
14
 and is hence less effective to water 
conservation. There are number of ways to analyse efficiency and usefulness of 
volumetric pricing methods. The first best efficiency is attainable only with a condition 
of no “distortionary” constraints notably information asymmetry, institutional 
arrangement or political intervention
15
. As mentioned, implementation costs tend to be 
larger in economic cost pricing, and volumetric method requires sophisticated 
institution i.e. installation of water meters to monitor use and administration to read and 
conduct maintenance of the meter, and collect fees
16
, and consequently there may be a 
situation where difference in implementation cost between volumetric and non 
volumetric methods outweigh difference in efficiency, non volumetric methods could 
make more economic sense to use
17
. Yacov Tsur (2000) found out implementation costs 
as a percentage of water proceeds is in inverse proportion to water price, and he 
identified when implementation cost is zero water price is US$ 11.5 and both water 
proceeds and social benefit (per acre) are among the highest US$355.10 and US$409.03 
                                                   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13 Johansson, R.C., 2000: 5 
14 Tsur, Y, 2000: 106 
15 Ibid. Johansson, R.C.,2000: 7 
16 Ibid. Johansson, R.C., 2000:4 
17 Ibid. Tsur, Y, 2000: 106 
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respectively and farmer‟s profit per acre is the lowest at US$408.7118 (see Table 1). 
However as implementation cost increases, the price decreases and at 10 percent 
threshold, water price is reduced to zero as the cost of conducting pricing scheme is so 
high that render water pricing unreasonable and result in lowest social benefit and 
highest farmer‟s profit and the effect produced is still the same as adopting per acre 
 
Table 1. Effects of Transaction Costs, Source: Tsur, Y (2000) pp 111 
 
(area) pricing method (implying at higher than 10 percent threshold, volumetric effects 
would become more skewed than fixed per area pricing)
19
. The condition strengthens a 
type of economic rent which makes private investment in wells for irrigation 
economically rational and efficient option for farmers. Operating and maintaining 
                                                   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
18 Ibid. Tsur, Y, 2000:110-112 
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irrigation wells and pumps are often the only direct consumption costs
20
, and high cost 
of implementation associated with fast and widespread development in private wells 
makes volumetric pricing unreasonable.  
A Canadian study based on Hanneman‟ s (1998) work further argues that there is 
theoretically no necessity in linking economic efficiency and cost recovery with 
volumetric pricing to cover the fixed cost component (construction of infrastructure and 
pipes). According to Hanneman, the average cost (capital and unit operating costs 
divided by quantity sold) and the marginal cost in water supply service are in equal 
relationship if costs of all units of water are the same
21
. Difference between the two 
costs, however, occurs in practice as the first instalment or a single water supply project 
will see the marginal cost fall faster than the average cost. The short term decline over 
the average cost occurs because while the average cost can be spread, the marginal cost 
corresponds with rising economies of scale with incremental production of unit of 
water
22
. Over the longer term, when deterioration necessitates an addition of newer and 
costlier capacity or additional projects, the marginal cost increase is much more rapid 
than the average cost
23
 and will then become lower again as scale economies gain 
become sufficiently large. Hence pricing based on marginal cost alone “can 
                                                   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
20 Wichelns, D, 2010:8 
21 Hanneman, 1998: 144 
22 Ibid. Hanemman, 1998:145-146 
23 Ibid. Hanemman, 1998:146-147 
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unintentionally lead to excessive profits or to deficits”24  and not suitable as stable 
measure for efficiency and cost recovery as revenue fluctuation can be large. On the 
other hand, if dividing the tariff into two components; volumetric portion to cover 
operating cost and fixed part to pay the fixed cost, or using changes in block rates 
(increasing or decreasing of price rate by blocks of quantity of water used)
25
, stability in 
cost recovery can be achieved while allocation efficiency is accounted for with 
volumetric price rates.            
There are also opinions that marginal cost pricing does not provide a useful concept. 
Molle and Berkoff (2007) argues that irrigation water is not designed to expand in the 
same manner as municipal water so as to allow economic pricing to be charged for an 
incremental capacity because irrigation water is treated as an intermediate good
26
. They 
say most surface canal water supply system is built to meet peak water requirements for 
a designated cropping arrangement because of stochastic nature of water availability 
and expanding the capacity simply because they had some good years cannot be 
justified as it would result in unit costs increase and permanent excessive capacity
27
.    
Pricing reflecting opportunity cost has its own limitations too, such that metrics to 
correctly evaluate values do not appear to exist. It is because opportunity value is 
                                                   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
24 bid. PRI Synthesis Report, 2005: 17 
25 Ibid. PRI Synthesis Report, 2005: 17 
26 Ibid. Molle and Berkoff, 2007:31 
27 Ibid. Molle and Berkoff, 2007:28-29 
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variable by place, season, time and reliability of water supply and such information is 
difficult to collect
28
. Frederiksen (1997) in a World Bank report, while accepting this as 
potentially feasible concept in allocation mechanism at least in developed countries, 
notes the variation is so much that affects investment plans, strategy to nullify political 
influence, and application to other usage aforementioned
29
. Morell and Berkoff (2007) 
question the expected effectiveness of the opportunity cost pricing when applied for 
irrigation water. They argue demands between municipal and irrigation sector the 
competitive allocation is limited by period and locations and as a resultant opportunity 
cost declines significantly once the urban demand is saturated
30
.  
The opportunity cost in such a case would diminish to the level of a residual value of 
irrigation which accounts for a very little part of full domestic demand
31
.  
 
To summarize, the value of water is characterized with complexities. The value may 
be contextual and is subject to a great variation given a type of use, time of use, and 
physical and policy environment (i.e. physical water flow and level of subsidy) a use is 
made. A lack of clarity and accuracy in information and knowledge may prohibit 
                                                   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
28 Ibid. FAO 2004:6 
29 Ibid. Frederiksen, H.D, 1997:572 
30 Ibid. Molle, F and Berkoff, J, 2007:32 
31 Ibid. FAO 2004:6 
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objective judgement and a proper and viable framework for optimal water pricing
32
.   
That complexity is greater in groundwater since monitoring is more difficult and 
particularly in an absence of systems of efficient allocation in India‟s groundwater 
resource rights regime which will later be discussed more in detail. Water therefore may 
have certain innate susceptibility to be driven and influenced by particular “interests” as 
FAO water report (2004) agrees that the issue is a political rather than economic and 
that “discretion” involved in the decision on what exact values to incorporate in a cost 
evaluation seems to be pointed out fundamental as a conceptual platform
33
 for value, 
cost and pricing discussions. 
 
3. Policy and Legal Setting for Water Efficiency 
Having discussed water pricing as an economically difficult concept to apply 
practically, a water policy and legal setting now enters into a focus for the two main 
themes of pricing: allocation efficiency and cost recovery.  
To answer the question, it helps to take a focus on institutions in particular as to 
whether there is an institutional framework in India where policy makers have a mindset 
for and are equipped to deal with complicated issues associated with water resource use. 
The conceptual groundwork for such holistic view and coordinated approach is already 
                                                   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
32 Dinar, A, 2000:6 
33 Ibid. FAO, 2004:6 
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laid in public policy forum notably with IWRM in which the notion calls for a process 
for coordinated management and development of water, land and associated resources 
for maximized economic and social benefit in sustainable manner
34
.  Cullet (2009) 
argues although the ideals in its principles are agreeable to many actors involved in the 
water management, it falls short of presenting specific and practical measures
35
. IWRM 
instead tells a conceptual guideline for actors to align with what some sections of 
international community identify as vital for reforming the existing management 
framework of water sector plagued with inefficiency and narrow and short-sighted 
sectorial approaches. Among the most essential elements include coordination of 
(policies surrounding) the competing factors such as water, land and other resources. As 
Cullet (2009) observes examples include linkage with the reforms in power sector since 
dominant role groundwater plays make electricity “a prime determinant of access to 
water”36.   Focus on water as economic good and eventual creation of water rights 
trading is implicitly reflected in an IWRM objective and as a reason for reforming water 
policy, legal framework and realignment of physical unit of management into river 
basins
37
. It is not, hence, surprising that the ideas such as water pricing and property 
rights are given greater emphasis to achieve and ensure efficiency of water resource 
                                                   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
34 Cullet, P, 2009:64 
35 Ibid. Cullet, P, 2009:64 
36 Ibid, P, 2009:65 
37 Ibid, P, 2009:67 
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allocation within the reformed water management framework
38
.  This thesis aims to deal 
with background issues i.e. those theoretical claims currently advocated in the debate of 
water sector reform with a focus on economic dimensions in particular, water pricing 
and regrettably excludes analysis on specific operational aspects of IWRM such as ways 
to achieve effective coordination or participation to strengthen the effectiveness for 
“integrated” management.                   
In India, there is no legal framework which enables water management to be 
delivered in coherent and comprehensive manner. It is multilayered and fragmented by 
sector, by the states, by the balance of power and by the historical developmental needs. 
Except judicial and constitutional recognition of human rights to water
39
, a guideline to 
balance supply side and demand side management towards sustainable use and to 
govern pricing and water entitlements does not exist as a single legal document. Instead, 
diversity is allowed as the state government‟s right of drafting water regulation is 
statutory protected by the Government of India Act, 1935 and the exclusive right is 
given to each state over regulation of water supplies, irrigation and canals, drainage and 
embankments, water storage, hydropower and fisheries with some restrictions on the 
use of trans-boundary rivers between the states
40
. On the other hand, the constitutional 
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role of the union (national) government over water management is mainly as a mediator 
and facilitator of trans-boundary water disputes or developments concerning the rivers 
shared between the states. But consideration for social equity in water policy has been 
the traditional stance of the Indian government and when the British introduced 
commercial irrigation, works for social needs were carefully separated
41
. In 1972 the 
Irrigation Commission of the Indian government had put forward tariff rate review for 
irrigation water but priority consideration is given for user (farmer) welfare and food 
security
42
. The policy for public water service reform thus inevitably faces this dilemma 
between the competing needs of opposite purposes. There exists an interface between 
economic infrastructure such as electricity and transport and social infrastructure such 
as health and education and as a consequence, water falls in a policy “limbo” in which 
decision makers find themselves dichotomised to choose either to charge appropriately 
higher as economic infrastructure (and justify its claims for larger budget allocation as 
in road service and potential private investment) or to charge low as social infrastructure 
which draws money entirely from public finance
43
. With ambiguity of the value of 
water, political inclination bound to be for a safer option. Consideration is given for 
lower value agriculture produces relative to other sectors and implementation of optimal 
                                                   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
41 Mohile, A.D.,2007:10 
42 Cullet, P, 2009:71 
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(economically justifying higher) pricing may be circumvented. Irrigation infrastructure 
is the epitome of such dichotomy. In the latest National Water Policy 2002 Document 
(NWP 2002), the urgent need for achieving efficiency in water utilization in light of 
rising water stress due to population and economic growth is highlighted and the 
national requirement for enhancing utilization of existing water potential is also stated
44
. 
Relevance for optimal pricing is in section 4 where it is articulated necessity with 
improved institutional arrangement for (managing) O&M and financial sustainability in 
section 11 where “water charges for various uses should be fixed in such a way that they 
cover at least the O&M and a part of the capital costs”45. Mohile (2007) points out water 
pricing as having given administration cost function and efficiency function through 
market mechanism is not given a place in the NWP 2002
46
. Failure to specifically 
stating (introduction of) market mechanism for promoting water efficiency may be 
explained by several reasons pertaining to India. Accurate and timely information on 
certainty of resource availability, exclusion or internalization of externalities or no harm 
to utilization by third parties, and possibility of reallocation over time in response to 
changing conditions all requires arrangement by well designed institutions
47
. But India 
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lacks the institutions, legislation and regulatory framework for formal market 
transactions to work
48
.  
 
The existing institutional arrangement for allocation by surface irrigation in Punjab is 
Warabandi which is basically a „queuing system” and not conductive to efficient 
allocation through formal market mechanism. The water rights are by historical doctrine 
on water access by the prior appropriation (first come first serve) and riparian (land) 
rights and because the legitimacy of these rights are grounded by virtue of discovery or 
possession and the most senior rights are vested in the owner of land who can put to 
beneficial use (e.g. by virtue of closeness to canal head)
49
 which is determined by the 
design of unlined canal systems. Certainty of water availability is also hampered by a 
lack of supply reliability because of neglect on maintenance of these canal systems and 
loss of water (detail of Punjab canal water system and Warabandi will be discussed in 
later section). The most significant institutional constraint in Punjab or India for 
implementing policies on efficient water allocation is relationship between land and 
(ground) water. The appurtenance of water to land effectively put a prohibition on 
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permanent water transfer unless land is accompanied in the sale
50
 which limits ability of 
timely reallocation in response to changing needs.    
 
Groundwater has been a realm of common law rights in India which are associated 
strongly with a land ownership of individual owners. This secures a certainty of private 
investment in groundwater well for extraction by existing land owing farmers. Even 
though there is a “principle of equitable allocation and no harm” to other riparian 
owners who share the same river stream
51
, the said does not apply to groundwater. The 
common law rules are based on customs and precedence, and the question is how much 
integration of such prerequisite principles into current laws for surface and ground water 
use is possible and in what way and how much it is enforceable to change the practices.    
One clue is the national groundwater law, the 2005 Model Bill on groundwater 
management and development. But the Model Bill does not seem to fulfil the role of 
helping implementation for optimal groundwater pricing policies. Firstly it is a newest 
update but based on previous suggestions made in 1970s and economic good aspects, 
demand management and cost recovery which have evolved since are not reflected
52
. 
Secondly only a registration to a groundwater authority is suffice for existing use which 
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means the authority has no means of exercising its control on current over-exploitative 
use
53
. In spite of such drawbacks on effectiveness, Punjab state is inclined to manage 
the groundwater not with the Model Bill but with incentives for crop diversification, 
investment in artificial recharge, micro irrigation and metering electricity use on well 
motor in critically withdrawn areas. The assumed reason is political consideration and 
sensitivity to implicit and explicit impacts on farmers
54
.         
Even in the developed countries, the EU Common Agricultural Policy has only 
recently started in calling for the shift of priority from issues of rural poverty 
alleviation, food self sufficiency to pollution, sustainable development, and budgetary 
and economic efficiency issues with accompanying calls for a shift from lower to higher 
irrigation price
55
.  
 
There is also a sense that international principles concerning water as an economic 
good may still fall short of gaining national consensus. As discussed, human rights and 
historical social rights maintain visible presence in Indian statutory and customary laws 
and institution, but pricing for economic efficiency and infrastructural cost recovery is a 
prescription based on neo-liberal policies with wider agenda of reducing a state role in 
                                                   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
53 Cullet, P, 2010: 3-4 
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management of irrigation at farm level and which aims at ultimate transfer of control to 
individual Water User Associations and traditional community groups such as 
Panchayat
56
. In India such self governance structure is increasing in the form of 
Participatory Irrigation Management (PIM) with a goal of improving efficiency and cost 
recovery driven by a sense of ownership
57
. Although achieving certain improvements in 
revenue recovery and availability of irrigation water to farmers, there seems to be a 
large variation between states in the degree of autonomy granted by irrigation or water 
department and capacities built and effectiveness which is often diminished by a lack of 
canal system rehabilitation and maintenance
58
. Madhav (2007) argues the reform may 
be driven more by the need of multilateral financial institutions to justify continued 
loans to irrigation projects and less concerned with ground realities and the assessed 
needs
59
.   
  The prevailing picture today still seems to be continuing plurality of official and local 
and traditional rules in terms of water access and use for domestic and irrigation 
purposes throughout India and this makes centralised implementation difficult. Local 
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rules are often institutionalised based on specific local historical use: i.e. governed by 
caste, unwritten and informal and displaced by new law formally enacted
60
. 
 
4. Water resource use and state of agriculture in Punjab:   
  The thesis now turns attention to water management conditions and systems in 
Punjab state which is located in the northwestern edge of India. Punjab may best 
illustrate the experience of agrarian led growth achieving a certain level of success and 
offer important lessons of the development dilemma between securing irrigation water 
and food and rural economic welfare that other water stressed emerging countries can 
face and of the need for appropriate water management for reliable irrigation supply. 
Also it shows the kind of economic development which may not be designed to 
accommodate a neo liberal economic prescription for an economy which is inflated by 
substantial financial support in inputs.  
  The Indus plains that provide the flat and fertile soil is a creation over the years of 
erosion of the Himalayas and siltation carried by the Indus River flooding which has a 
thick alluvium layer over the depth of 1,300 feet (396 metres) down to the rock 
bottom
61
. According to the information based on Central Ground Water Board in 2006, 
this thick alluvial floodplain deposits cover 97 percent of the state‟s whole area 
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characterized with a considerable aquifer storage capacity and saline part which is only 
present at greater depth
62
. Having a better storage capacity means its resources may be 
better prepared for scarcity if managed properly. Given regional variation in rainfall and 
growing industrial capacity, it is in fact suggested the returns from supporting (growing) 
population centre and food needs of other neighbouring basin is inherently large, but 
intense, variable and concentrated nature of monsoonal rainfall which lasts only three or 
so months requires efficient use for such incremental future needs of water resources
63
.          
  Punjab is characterized by substantial utilization of groundwater resources for 
agriculture. According to the Ministry of Water Resources data in 2003, Punjab state 
has 18.66 BCM/yr (billion cubic metres per year) as total replenishable groundwater 
resource and 16.79 BCM/yr as available groundwater resources for irrigation with a net 
draft of 16.40 BCM/yr which lead to 97.66% as a percentage of groundwater 
development
64
. During 2001-2002 groundwater accounted for 48.9 percent as a share of 
total ultimate potential for irrigation in the state
65
. It is estimated in India as a whole 
groundwater contributes to over 60% of irrigated agriculture and 85% of drinking water 
needs
66
 which denotes that the resource dependency is of an extraordinary scale. 
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Groundwater development is associated with Punjab‟s large agricultural economy in 
which farmers make livelihood of growing rice and wheat, the two nationally important 
crops.  
  The Green Revolution since 1960s provided farmers with input subsidies on 
electricity and water as well as new seeds and fertilizers
67
and had propelled significant 
agrarian economic development in the state. Credit support was provided to help 
farmers 
 
Figure 1. Evolution of canal, tank, and well irrigation in India 1950-2000 
Source: Bhatia 2005, cited in Asia Development Bank 2009 
purchase pump technologies and subsidized rural electricity prices to operate the well
68
. 
Easy availability of bank loans have assisted farmers construction of deeper wells with 
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sophisticated pumps first with dug-cum-bore wells that reached 50 to 100 feet deep with 
centrifugal pumps and later in mid 80s the investments were made in submersible 
pumps with the well depth increased to 400 feet in large areas
69
. Figure 1 shows 
timescale of development of agricultural water source which explains rapid expansion 
of tube well overtaking surface canal as a main contributor to irrigated areas in India, 
which grew by 84% since 1960s
70
. Until around 1981, the agrarian boom contributed to 
a significant decline in the number of small and marginal farmers who had responded to 
the economic opportunities for which rising yield, employment, lease or sale of land, 
and diversifying into non-farming jobs provided
71
. Currently, 20 percent of wheat and 9 
percent of rice is produced in the state for the nation‟s food stock and the agriculture 
supports rural livelihood for 66 percent of the total 27.5 million people with per capita 
income of Rs35, 700
72. Punjab‟s switch of production to rice and wheat from traditional 
rain-water crop (maize) is also induced by a food grain procurement programme in 
which the national government promises to guarantee a minimum support price (MSP) 
for rice and wheat above world and local prices
73
. The policy is designed to satisfy food 
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stock requirement for public distribution
74
. In 1970 and 71 the MSP for rice and wheat 
per 100 kilogram was at Rs 51 and Rs 76 respectively and increased in 2008 and 2009 
to the level of Rs 1,050 and 1,000
75
. 
As a result of guaranteed purchase scheme and the input subsidies, cropped area 
under irrigation in Punjab today is 97 percent and 74 percent of which is from 
groundwater source and 80 percent of which grows rice and wheat
76
. Cropping intensity 
and productivity of rice and wheat are very high, between 2003 and 2004 it had 188.2 
percent, 3,694kg/ha, and 4,207 kg/ha respectively
77
. Paddy rice however is the principal 
source of water consumption whose typical irrigation water requirement is 180cm and 
between 1998 and 2005 in central Punjab district, groundwater table had fallen by 76cm 
with corresponding increase in area under rice paddy from 1,733,000 to 2,000,000 
hectare
78
. According to State Department of Soil and Water Conservation, 14.5 lakh 
hectare meters (one lakh =100,000) of water come from surface canal and 16.6 lakh 
hectare meters come from ground recharge for 43.7 lakh hectare meters of the state‟s 
agricultural water requirement and the remaining 12.4 lakh hectare meters has to be 
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sourced through (overexploitation of) groundwater
79
. This is largely related to flood 
irrigation of paddy field which has been a main irrigation technique but also widespread 
use of high yielding varieties (HYVs) of rice crops. 
   According to national assessment in 2004 by the Central Ground Water Board, 75 
percent of groundwater blocks in Punjab state are already overdrawn
80
 (see Figure 2). 
The depth of water tables: 6.79metre in Ludhiana, 5.86m in central belt area, and 6.85m 
in all Punjab average had dropped in 2001 to currently 10.01m, 11.44m, and 9.93m 
respectively
81
.  Of particular importance is the fact that the majority of tube well is 
shallow and owned and operated by private farmers. Apart from some use for drinking 
and industrial purpose, there are around a million shallow tube wells as compared to 
3,162 deep tube wells and primarily having been served irrigation for area by 2.8m ha 
and 1.6m ha respectively
82
. Groundwater contributes to better yields and purchases are 
made by non-well owners because of the merit. For instance the data shows rice‟s 
average yield by canal only is 522kg per acre, but 709kg/acre by public tube well, 
784kg/acre by purchased water from tube well and 859kg/acre by own tube well
83
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In South Asia (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nepal) as a whole, some estimate 
puts the electricity consumed for agricultural pumping is around 69.6billion kWh per 
year with implying total cost Rs 174 billion ($3.8 billion)
84
. It further estimates 
irrigation water generated has a market value around Rs 450-550 billion ($9.8 to $12 
billion) and contribution to agricultural output at roughly Rs 1,350 to 1,650 billion 
($29.3 to $35.9 billion)
85
. 
In India alone, it is estimated that 70 to 80% of the value of output from irrigation is 
derived from pump source
86
. Shah et al argue that this economic structure and scale of 
farmer income and livelihood dependence makes unfit to take any hard-line policy 
intervention in immediacy
87
. But subsidy to rural electricity for the tube wells 
constitutes a significant portion of financial loss to State Electricity Board (SEB). The 
2002 Planning Commission figure suggests national gross subsidy made to agricultural 
consumers was Rs 281 billion in 2001-2 which is estimated to have risen almost 80 
percent from Rs 156 billion in 1996-7 and during 1999-2000 SEBs have realized a mere 
3.2 percent in the total revenue of the sales made to agriculture sector which consists of 
one third of SEBs overall customers
88
. The agricultural subsidy was responsible to the 
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state revenue deficit of Punjab by two- thirds in 2000-1
89
. As a consequence currently in 
Punjab electricity for farmers is provided free of charge
90
 and itself provides no 
incentive for users to conserve water and a large number of scattered private wells  
 
Figure 2. Area and intensity of groundwater development and use in Punjab 
Source: Department of Soil & Water Conservation, Punjab State Government, as of 1998 
 
makes it undesirable to meter the power use and volumetric pricing a difficult policy 
option
91
. There are also socio-economic constraints for implementing optimal pricing. 
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According to Sidhu (2005) productivity of shallow tube well yield has become lower 
and average cost of deepening of a well for marginal productivity has almost doubled 
from Rs.4,219 per deepened tube well in 1990 to Rs. 8,184 in 1999 which cumulatively 
have been costing Punjabi well users Rs. 200 crore (one crore = ten million) every 
year
92
. Singh further notes economic difficulty of small and marginal farmers which 
consist of 62 per cent of the total farm households (1,143,500 households) in the state 
and 56.25 per cent of which are indebted
93
with average amount of Rs.47,516
94
. Bhatia 
(2007) points out devastating impacts if electricity subsidies were slashed completely on 
marginal farmer income in neighbouring Haryana state in which tariff is “charged at flat 
rate” and can illustrate the similar impact on Punjabi farmers. He estimates that an 
average tariff increase would be 213 per cent as a result of rationalization which would 
push the electricity cost alone to Rs 12,365/ha as compared to total irrigation cost Rs 
11,230/ha with subsidized electricity and would result in negative net farm income at Rs 
2,935/ha which is a decrease by around 153 per cent from net farm income at Rs 
5,480
95
. This would make a policy intervention which involves removal of electricity 
subsidies difficult politically and in practical sense. 
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There is also a limited prospect for increase in farmer‟s income through national food 
distribution system which has guaranteed purchase at MSP. The 1955 Essential 
Commodity Act (ECA) authorizes a compulsory levy on rice millers by the Food 
Corporation of India (FCI) in which 75 percent of Punjab‟s milled rice is commanded to 
be sold to the state agency at a predetermined price that is often lower than the market 
price
96
. The ability of farmers for marketing freely of their rice produce is further 
restricted by the ECA provision to limit farmer sales to wholesale market yards and 
until the levy commitments are fulfilled
97
. This is played out in a general trend in which 
crop productivity has been stagnant and climatic change factor which projects impacts 
on reduced average annual rainfall and noticeable variation in both maximum and 
minimum temperature and humidity levels during the crucial term of growth of the 
crops
98
. The deterioration of farmer economic welfare may have an important 
implication that further exacerbation of groundwater mining would spontaneously come 
to a certain degree of stabilization and economic optimization through electricity 
subsidy rationalization may render harder socio-economic damage to individual farmers 
and possibly beyond. There is also a prospect that Punjab may have reached a saturation 
point in cultivated area and net irrigated area which limits prospect of significant 
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irrigation expansion
99
. These specific factors may stop the new developments of 
groundwater but still fall short of ensuring conservation and long term sustainability of 
existing use and especially to adapt to predicted negative impacts of climate variability 
on water resources in Punjab. So what other options are effective for achieving such 
objectives? 
 
5. Restoring Reliability of Water Supply and Water Use      
Punjab‟s gravity canal supply systems were investments by the then British East 
India Company in 19
th
 century which completely transformed the region‟s pattern of 
agriculture from pastoral to intensively cultivated irrigation
100
. Official government 
schemes and projects have been directed at supply augmentation rather than demand 
management and have resulted in the systems failure due to poor operation and 
maintenance
101
. Yet the state assumes a role as a protector of rural interest and a 
provider of large public irrigation. The Northern India Canal and Drainage Act 1873 
transferred planning, implementation and management responsibility of the irrigation 
water systems to the state bureaucracies from local communities and landlords who had 
exercised traditional control
102
.      
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Contrary to the promise, a lack of reliability of public irrigation services in Punjab 
may have persisted since and argued as a root cause of extensive groundwater 
development. Restoration of the reliability constitutes a logical answer to more 
sustainable conjunctive use and management of surface and subsurface water. However 
India as a whole has achieved only half the target of surface irrigation development 
projects as specified in the Ninth Five Year Plan (1997-2002) and still around 30 
percent of an estimated national irrigation potential total (140 million hectares) is said to 
be under-exploited
103
. In the latest Tenth Plan (2002-2007), the outlay had jumped to 
Rs71,213 crore (one crore equals ten-million) from the previous Rs 42,968 crore
104
. 
This is not easy given India has an overall fiscal stress of central and state budget with a 
deficit and rising public debt
105
. Though public investment for irrigation infrastructure 
(new construction and rehabilitation of the existing) had risen by US$ 20billion from 
1990 to 2007, the data available suggests a fall by more than 3 million hectare of the net 
area supplied by all sizes of irrigation infrastructure
106
. This raises a question of 
efficiency in public irrigation water supply investments. To understand the reason and 
explain why farmers turn their back to public scheme may need to look at the 
institutional problems of state irrigation department.  
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Neglecting the need and a lack of capacity for proper infrastructure management 
relates to low value attached to irrigation water. Jairath J (1985) points out this link as 
the conditions of Punjabi farmers‟ access to water and operational efficiency in terms of 
quantity, certainty and control of water supply ruled by a certain allotted time, which is 
hindered by underinvestment and exacerbated by the mode of utilization
107
. The surface 
water supply from multipurpose storage dams constructed on major Indus river 
tributaries such as Bhakhra on Sutlej and Pong on Beas was often fluctuated due to 
canal closure for maintenance of breaches and cuts and shortage resulting from drought 
and diversion to other sectoral needs notably hydroelectricity and flood control
108
. In 
addition to supply unreliability closer at the river source, distribution mode based on 
time allotment, called „warabandi‟, rather than volumetric allocation, and unlined 
channels (named as „kutcha‟) all subjects to lower allocation efficiency particularly for 
the tail land holders. Warabandi, the system prevalent in Punjab in India and Pakistan, 
of an irrigation schedule allotted to equal groups of members for every 8 days does not 
necessarily guarantee certainty and control as the rotation gets passed around each 
group and the time for the second round of irrigation water allotment is after 8 
multiplied by number of groups
109
. The time given for each turn is further influenced by 
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the size of land and the distance from the head. The time calculated by the available 
water time per week per acre multiplied by land size is granted with an allowance for 
extra time needed for water reaching to each plot (known as „bharai‟) and the tail water 
flow is granted to the last beneficiary (known as „nikal‟)110. The discharge (flow per unit 
of time) and capacity potential is undermined by fluctuation at the source, and then 
farther down the watercourse, with evaporation, leakage, seepage and even breaches
111
. 
Punjab‟s unlined-gravity canal structure degrades water efficiency more quickly as it is 
prone to weeds and silt and reduces velocity and discharge crucial for time based 
allocation
112
. The losses in water efficiency and capacity potential could be mitigated if 
proper maintenance was provided by the Irrigation Department. However, often the 
justification to provide adequate expenditure in maintenance of the conveyance system 
has not been strong due to the low economic value of water in agriculture
113
. It 
disregards the importance of prioritizing irrigation service and consequently, 
expenditure is made only at no-plan and ad-hoc basis which results in persistent 
shortage of capacity for proper construction and maintenance of the system
114
. 
Consumed by departmental costs, budgetary dispensation for the maintenance fund 
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could only cover Rs5.00 per hectare out of Rs 50.00 per hectare as per recommended
115
. 
This is a serious problem because economic incentive of individual farmers to invest in 
maintenance and betterment of irrigation systems tends to be low due to the system‟s 
public good nature which necessitates collective management
116
. Distribution beyond 
the government mandated control point is however, delegated to individual plot holders 
who are left to self-manage arrangements such as the turn of their water allotment time 
sequence, field channel layout and maintenance
117
.  
Unreliability in irrigation system has secondary negative economic impacts because 
this forces farmers, as in Maharashtra, to choose low value and drought tolerant crops 
such as coarse grains and millet
118
. The prospect of individual allocation efficiency is 
further reduced by the location of „nakkas‟, the fixed water feeding points for individual 
plot, at which allocated time for users is reduced proportionately to the number of 
nakkas needing to be fed ahead of his
119
.             
 
The necessary coordination between the Punjab State Irrigation Department and 
individual irrigators to deliver irrigation water efficiently and equitably did not seem to 
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have existed. The mistrust to the State Irrigation Department seemed to exist as long as 
its management problem derived from neglect and of corruption
120
. A collective 
management framework with laissez-faire approach is weak without any incentives. 
Irrigators simply leave from a collective responsibility of canal management as soon as 
one of member farmers possessed an alternative access to his tube well source
121
.  In 
such an environment, pursuing policy for a recovery to financial health by optimal 
volumetric pricing on canal supply would put collective management system at more 
risk when better alternatives (incentives) exist. Reforming canal water pricing to 
economically optimal level seems unrealistic in Punjab‟s context. But there is evidence 
to suggest that farmers might have a certain willingness to pay for a better service. Peter 
Rogers et al (1997) argue potentially very high willingness to pay for timely and 
reliable irrigation water supplies citing Haryana farmers, who are charged below US$ 
10/ha/yr for canal water supplies, spend nearly US$90/ha/yr in irrigation costs which 
accounts for roughly 20 percent of the net value of additional output capacity per 
hectare (twice as much from canal irrigation) from groundwater
122
. Similarly Upmanu 
Lall (2009) finds in his study in Punjab villages that wasteful water extraction is 
primarily due to “not-on-demand” unreliable electricity supply which forces farmers 
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with no choice but to operate constantly by leaving the pumps on and over irrigate
123
. 
Many Punjabi farmers explicitly state their willingness to pay for metered use if the 
electricity supply is dependable
124
.  From the argument, what may be clear is that 
farmers are as rational actors once risks and uncertainty are addressed. The inefficiency 
may not necessarily entirely be attributable to many Punjabi or Indian farmers neglect 
or idleness.  
 
Implementing fully an optimal volumetric pricing for efficient use seems questionable 
in other countries. A study in one French regional agricultural sector has shown 
irrigation pricing based purely on marginal cost first best efficiency principle had to be 
dented in favour of less painful “conjunctive method of pricing and quota. In Charente 
river basin, water price is structured for farmers to choose either a fixed rate based on 
irrigated acreage (€81) or the subscribed flow (€38) with a variable rate proportional to 
the water volume (either rate at €0.06/m3), and maintains homogeneous average price 
which is determined with consideration for cropping patterns, market conditions, and 
willingness to pay which is compared to infrastructure‟s financial costs (total and 
average per hectare) and the rate for subsidy for the investment
125
. The study findings 
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invoke a careful consideration when designing a water pricing structure. There is a 
general tendency of low price elasticity for water to farmers when the price is a small 
portion in their total production costs or incomes and is different at elasticity at each 
level which is influenced by different constraints
126
. Although the increase did lower the 
water use, the blanket application of volumetric-based-only price increase would simply 
damage farmers and invited their strong opposition
127
. Berbel et al (2007) points in 
south Italy where water price increase would come to a point of demand inelasticity as 
only the high value vegetables and fruits are left to pay the higher water price and if 
other water saving techniques has already been available, water demand come down to 
zero above the threshold of water demand inelasticity because farmers are better off not 
using the water
128
. It is in agreement with findings by Jalota et al (2007) whose 
biophysical-economic model simulation demonstrated a pattern of price elasticity to 
water demand up to a certain threshold and change in behavior of Punjabi farmers in 
favour of choosing crops more economically lucrative at the expense of growing 
traditional water intensive crops such as rice in certain conditions. But above the 
threshold, water demand becomes inelastic due to more important considerations. Data 
used for simulation were based on extension services practiced in the Punjab 
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Agricultural University, and incorporate inputs such as rainfall patterns and the area‟s 
soil type to allow for optimal timing for irrigation application and thereby enable to 
calculate efficient frontier for irrigation water
129
. Without irrigation pricing 
considerations, the simulation results suggested rice, the main summer season (kharif)  
crop had the lowest yield response to irrigated water which only increased at a rate of 
8kg per hectare while other summer crop maize expanded yield per mm of irrigated 
water by 32kg per hectare and winter (rabi) crop wheat by 34 kg per hectare
130
. This 
supports stagnant crop productivity Punjab is experiencing. Jalota et al (2007) found 
response to irrigation water pricing increases could lead to diversification into soybean 
in summer (kharif) and wheat in winter (rabi) seasons as the most economically 
efficient choice giving higher returns to the irrigation cost (see Table 2). Beyond $10 
mL
-1
 both risk neutral and risk-averse farmers stop growing rice and shift to cotton 
and/or soybeans with significant decrease in the quantity of irrigation water applied on 
the paddy (QIW). Risk of income variation is the biggest factor of influencing cropping 
pattern choice. Inclusion of cotton for risk averse farmers at higher water price signifies 
that while a shift to soybean monoculture has higher income variance than cotton, they 
prefer lower income variance (i.e. prefer income stability) to higher income
131
. The 
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problem with this simulation is that they are not based on empirical data and for risk-
averse farmers above a threshold price at US$15 to $20 mL
-1
, water demand stays 
Strong in summer and more importantly, a high value alternative crop lacks guaranteed 
income stability unlike rice and wheat which has a support through government 
procurement policy
132
. Crop diversification away from rice and wheat is in fact 
contemplated as Punjab‟s state policy. According to Shergill (2005), Punjab‟s sense of 
“agrarian crisis” and the policy with which the state tries to address is not driven 
primarily by groundwater and related environmental problem, but rather by stagnation 
in farm income and farmers‟ fear “psychosis” of possible deterioration in the staple crop 
price for which implementation of the World Trade Organization free trade agenda in 
complete and inadvertent manner can cause
133
.     
 
Having discussed water from angles of economic demand management based on 
pricing and potential relevance to Punjab‟s particular situation, one would begin to see 
appropriate approach to (ground) water management in the state and it would involve 
two tracks – one with alternatives, using cost effective water saving techniques to 
volumetric pricing in arresting decline of water table for immediate effect and being 
able to avoid causing negative repercussions on farmers‟ economic welfare. 
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  Table 2. Simulation of farmer response of alternative crops to water price increase   
  Source: Jalota SK et al (2007) pp 1081  
 
The other would be a long term strategy to progressively reform public water supply 
system for improved reliability in canal irrigation and electricity for groundwater as a 
buffer resource and gradual introduction of two-tier pricing structure similar to the 
French example primarily to restore financial health of the public water sector. 
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6. Reform at Dual Track - Cost Effective Technology and Electricity Subsidy   
Punjab‟s fortune as well as misfortune is that the region has one of the most fertile 
soils in the world
134
 and the central government and rice farmers do not want to lose the 
advantage they have to deal with impending food demand increase. The promise of 
potential better income with implementation of economic pricing policy to induce 
production of higher value vegetables and fruits sound unconvincing due to various 
uncertainties. It is thus likely that the state retains rice and wheat as main crops for 
foreseeable future. Theoretically, the state of Punjab can reduce water use without 
recourse to volumetric pricing and has already elaborated measures using agricultural 
techniques which are potentially able to save water at least individual (not cumulative) 
scale which can come close to level rice‟s water consumption. For instance, the state 
government order in 2008 to prohibit early transplanting of paddy which has been the 
practice and necessitated flood irrigation is estimated to have water saving effect by 210 
mm because by delaying the transplant from mid-May to mid-June, the peak water need 
for paddy can be arranged with the arrival of monsoon rains
135
. In addition to water 
saved the new practice also has two beneficial factors. It does not raise qualms among 
farmers about the shift since yields have not been negatively affected and it results in 
saving electricity as data reports the savings of 1,950 million kWh of energy which 
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could otherwise cost Rs 585 crore
136
. It is also cost effective. Against the net saving the 
method can generate, infrastructure rehabilitation could cost roughly US$0.02 per cubic 
metres and on farm canal lining at the cost of US$0.06 per cubic metres with smaller 
effect on water availability increase
137
. The system of rice intensification (SRI) is 
estimated to reduce the water need by 370 mm
138
 and still conductive to higher 
productive tillers and more leaves
139
. The World Bank report suggests implementing all 
major water saving methods with laser leveling (410 mm), timed irrigation with 
tensiometer (370mm) and short duration rice varieties (300mm), plus delayed 
transplanting and SRI can save 1,660 mm which makes up almost 90 percent of baseline 
water requirement for growing rice (1,840mm)
140
.   
As discussed earlier groundwater development is a consequence of both unreliable 
canal supplies as well as subsidized agricultural input policies. Current electricity 
subsidy scale is likely to pass down costs with consequences of persistent deficit at 
SEBs balance sheet. This would undermine seriously energy utility‟s capacity to deal 
with a rising future demand not just from farmers but from other sectors. Singh and 
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Kumar (2010) argue between 1995 and 2100, India, with current growth scenarios, 
would need to increase total electricity generation capacity from 96 GW to 912 GW
141
.   
The objectives of tariff reform at electricity must be to disconnect the vicious circle of 
inefficient water and electricity use and poor level of electricity supply management. 
Sebastian Morris (2007) argues that subsidies reform would have to entail change to 
direct and incentive compatible that generates multiple benefits in order to garner 
necessary political support
142
. The political support is essential because the realignment 
has objectives to address ineffectiveness of current subsidy allocation which creates 
waste and possible corruption. Morris points out almost two-thirds of total fiscal cost 
spent for subsidization may be in excess of the value of transfer actually delivered to 
intended groups and about the third of the cost may be paid for illegitimate transfers 
(leakages etc) and the rest for avoidable losses and the various social costs may reduce 
the actual value of subsidy transfers to the intended beneficiary to a small part of the 
total social cost
143
. Reform design to improve efficiency of subsidies rather than 
removal or reduction eventually serves for two goals of saving of costs and of 
strengthening the SEBs finance to improve the supply reliability. For instance direct 
subsidies can be in a form of issuing stamps which do not distort the market price (in 
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the event of eventual introduction of two part pricing structure, quota and volumetric, 
for electricity or water which allows transaction in the market) and prevent parallel 
distribution system from developing
144
. Subsidies which are direct and incentive 
compatible can be provided for seeds which consumes less water and high value crops 
and also for technologies such as aforementioned and drip irrigation. The cumulative 
cost saving effect on farm level of electricity upon full implementation of such 
measures could be enormous as some individual cases aforementioned have 
exemplified. This would in a long run relaxes budgetary stress through savings and 
incentive gains and by retaining transfer benefit to honest and hard-working farmers and 
marginalizes those group who has illegitimately benefited from leakages and diversion 
of electricity and may lower political hurdle for continuing a deeper structural reform 
including progressive shift to a French style two tier pricing
145
.  
 
7. Conclusion: What scenario for stronger Punjab water resource management?   
   Decisions on water management are made within specific socio-political and technical 
context and constrained by the factors such as capacity of infrastructure, physical 
availability of surface water and resource impacts of supply system development and 
limited further by different administrative regulations and court decreed rights and these  
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are not always amenable to economically optimal outcomes
146
. Financial restrictions 
can exacerbate the political setting
147
.   
  Technically economic efficiency in water use and effectiveness in water conservation 
may be counteracted by necessary institutional i.e. legal and administrative 
arrangements to implement mechanisms such as trading via market and for monitoring 
volumetric usage. Findings and discussions on the issue appear to imply volumetric 
marginal cost based pricing for irrigation work effectively only in a condition – on 
individual farm level – that when price elasticity for water demand is high. For many 
Punjabi farmers it may turn out to be too high to bear for their economic survival. It also 
appears that for India the cost of price rationalization may be unacceptable for the 
reason of food and social security. Therefore the system of larger scale, equitable and 
economically optimal pricing and market for irrigation water requires long term 
approach for Punjab or India.      
 
A more likely scenario for possibly short or medium term is to aim for “soft landing” 
of current practice causing excessive stress of groundwater in the state. The thesis 
attempted to show the potential effectiveness of realistic approaches using cost efficient 
and water saving techniques or technology with which author believes of having a good 
                                                   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
146 Ibid. National Research Council, US, 1997: 26 
147 Ibid. National Research Council, US, 1997: 26 
53 
 
 
 
prospect given positive results in pilot cases. The author also believes viability of the 
discussion for attempting the institutional reform first on restoring an efficiency of 
current electricity subsidy to recover reliability of supply while securing political 
support from farmers for eventual recovery to sustainable and profitable basis of the 
operation of the utility. Direct subsidy makes conditions where it may encourage 
farmers to invest for at least diversification into less water consuming crops and 
irrigation technology. Given strategic importance of rice and wheat and prospect of 
agricultural trade liberalization, the government should at least prepare for developing 
an enabling environment and a safety net to absorb the shock over which farmers have 
no control. Saving of water and the cost of supporting this input provision should also 
be encouraged to help finance this objective.  
This would further lead to eventual water management framework in the scale of 
river basin for the region. This is because the cost-benefit analysis would increasingly 
demand considerations for service of upstream ecosystems and externalities involving 
diverse sectorial needs. The sheer scale benefit this entails could also open economic 
possibilities for formal basin water trading and public (or potentially private) 
investments in water infrastructure for new capacity or maintenance purposes. However 
to justify the administrative costs e.g. formal registration of water rights, surface and 
groundwater physical monitoring to supervision and mediation of ensuring equitable 
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allocation
148
, proper economic valuation for benefits and costs of basin water systems 
has to be made, and a revision of existing irrigation water pricing would in this end 
remain relevant. A major problem in pushing this agenda is how to mobilize political 
will to work on internalization of such neglected values and costs for designing 
practically and politically implementable water (electricity) pricing at individual farm 
level to pay as “sustainability cost”.  
 
Analysis on Punjab‟s water management is thus essential due to an unusually 
important role groundwater plays. How to treat groundwater‟s benefits and costs has 
several important implications. Groundwater‟s main value lies as a supplementary 
source for diminished availability in times of droughts as natural storage
149
. According 
to Tsur and Graham-Tomasi (1991), total value of groundwater is derived from its 
contribution as an increased overall water supply and on-demand usage which can 
reduce fluctuation in surface water source and hence has a positive buffer value in 
irrigation system
150
. As discussed with supply constraints of unlined canal irrigation, 
Punjab‟s groundwater buffer value would remain high for tail-end land holders who 
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lose out at the end of supply queue and would remain important if the system aims to 
follow conjunctive water supply.      
Groundwater also represents greater resource value - its reliability contributes to 
higher yield and income and stabilizes demand for more associated inputs and labour
151
. 
Many in groundwater economics discussions seem to suggest that best efficiency is 
attained when the rate of extraction maximizes net benefits (total benefits net of total 
costs) over time and the costs included are of extraction and delivery which increases 
with depth of water table and of opportunity (or user) cost of future users
152
. The current 
extraction is only efficient if higher costs of future are properly estimated
153
. But the 
thesis‟s analysis showed this is not the case in Punjab‟s current context and even cost 
benefit analysis for efficient use is hampered due to difficulties in monitoring. 
Institutional arrangements foreseeing the user cost increases uncertainties surrounding 
transaction costs.  
This thesis has discussed opportunity and marginal costs are variable components 
subject to changes in usage and availability. If conserving groundwater is increasingly 
attainable goal in Punjab using several low cost water saving techniques, the implied 
assumption is a growth in marginal benefit derived from savings in (ground) water and 
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electricity. One Columbia University study indicated prospective result from a pilot 
case in Punjab paddy fields in which conservation by up to 35 percent of water was 
attained using originally devised tensiometer costing just $6 to monitor precise timing 
for paddy water application and a number of test application is increased to 5,000 
farmers
154
. One would have to include specific costs of these measures, empirical data 
on marginal benefit on such pilot farm plots and rule of balanced financial account of 
the electricity provider (affecting the rate of electricity price change considerations) to 
estimate whether this could lead to an overall efficiency gain. A marginal value of water 
determines farmer willingness to pay for water
155
, but this is still too simplistic 
assumption in that other variables such as farm inputs uses (e.g. fertilizer), hours of 
irrigation, soil characteristics and other exogenous factors need to be considered. One 
integrated estimation model in a semi-arid Indian community suggests marginal value 
of rice Rs 4.5/ hour of irrigation and as compared to other crop types such as pulses (Rs 
114/h) and flowers (Rs 98/h), rice still reflects significantly low water scarcity value
156
. 
 The assumption that volumetric charge may prove more implementable once such 
balance offsetting effects are attained also calls for a challenge. Two-tier pricing method 
with block rates structure as briefly discussed may allow flexibility and equity because 
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farmers with greater agricultural output either try to avoid a use in excess of a certain 
block of volume otherwise they are penalized with increased price and are rewarded for 
a reduction if crop pattern change drops water use. Brill et al (1997) found out in 
empirical studies of Israeli farmers that block pricing did not necessarily prompt 
behaviour leading to water efficiency in at least one of three groups in which the 
assigned quota is based on historical rights and alternative option would simply 
diminish efficiency due to information cost associated with access to the details of each 
crop functions for production
157
. Though groundwater in Punjab is historical rights 
attached to land, decisions to diversify crop patterns could be related more with income 
security as discussed i.e. lower profit variance as a consequence of lower productivity 
and exogenous factor such as lack of assured markets
158
. Nevertheless, water user 
association could save transaction costs in districts of Punjab where homogeneity is 
strong which allow comprehensive metering. Alternatively the indigenous warabandi 
system has accessibility to information on the duration of irrigation and could allow 
possibility of charges based on hours as a proxy for volumes
159
. A profitability 
threshold in a semi-arid Indian community is estimated at Rs 0.5/h of charge based on 
irrigation hours for rice and indicates higher price can only be absorbable by promoting 
                                                   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
157 Brill E, et al, 1997: 958-959 
158 Ibid. Jalota et al., 2007: 1073 
159 Ibid. Shiferaw, B et al., 2008 337 
58 
 
 
 
crop diversification
160
 in this method. The brief analysis suggests price optimality is 
dependent on crop patterns and constraints may be greater in rice and measures such as 
market price support are necessary for diversifying into less water intensive crops in a 
place such as Punjab. 
 
Then the role of quota and/or taxation may be to charge for the sustainability cost of 
groundwater ensures equitable collection also from non well owners. Potential 
economic damage especially for the poor could be mitigated with issuance of purpose 
direct subsidy such as a stamp (for pump electricity) as discussed. In the same reason, a 
possibility may exist on provision of “green payments” as an incentive to those farmers 
to lower the irrigation water and grow high value crops which help recover “social and 
environmental” costs161. A taxation to halt groundwater mining is an official policy 
contemplated for the Twelfth Five Year Plan of India‟s Planning Commission162 and it 
could pay for the environmental purpose such as enhancing natural recharge zones and 
remedying aquifer contamination so it effectively works as a cross subsidization. A 
delayed realization in the benefit with possibilities of time span difference may coerce a 
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contriving. However to verify, a separate analysis would be necessary for the level and 
design of appropriate groundwater tax.   
Water price optimization is a right path in principle, with basin scale water trading 
market as ultimate goal and gradual and targeted volumetric pricing in which 
effectiveness may be sub-optimal, can be made possible with (water and) cost savings 
and targeted electricity subsidy reform.   
 
What can be argued for Punjab is that the change is just a part of broader and long 
term adjustments for sustainability path and be influenced by government response to 
food demand growth and to demand for farmers‟ welfare. The pricing would therefore 
denote an inducement to engaging in a wider reform agenda of governance and never as 
a stand-alone panacea. 
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